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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge: 
 
On this consolidated appeal of two cases jointly 
adjudicated in the District Court for the District of New 
Jersey, Junior Samuel Myrie and Norwood L. White, both of 
whom are inmates of New Jersey prisons, contend that the 
District Court erred in sustaining the validity-- challenged 
under several provisions of the Constitution of the United 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Honorable Louis H. Pollak, United States District Judge for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation 
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States and cognate provisions of the Constitution of New 
Jersey -- of N.J. Stat. Ann. S 30:4-15.1. The statute 
provides: 
 
       CHAPTER 396 
 
       An Act concerning payment of Crime Compensation 
       Board assessments and supplementing Title 30 of the 
       Revised Statutes. 
 
       BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General 
       Assembly of the State of New Jersey: 
 
       C.30:4-15.1 Collection of "VCCB Surcharge" by 
       commissary in correctional facility. 
 
        1. Every commissary in a county or State 
       correctional facility operated for the sale of 
       commodities shall collect a surcharge of 10% of the 
       sales price of every item sold. The surcharge shall be 
       known as the "VCCB Surcharge." All funds collected 
       pursuant to this section shall be forwarded to the State 
       Treasurer for deposit in the Victims of Crime 
       Compensation Board Account, shall be subject to 
       reporting and accounting procedures pursuant to the 
       provisions of section 2 of P.L. 1979, c.396 (C.2C:43:3.l) 
       and shall be used in satisfying claims pursuant to the 
       provisions of the "Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 
       of 1971," P.L. 1971, c.317 (C.52:4B-1 et seq.). A sale 
       subject to surcharge under this section shall not be 
       subject to any tax imposed under the "Sales and Use 
       Tax Act," P.L. 1966, c.30 
       (C.54:32B-1 et seq.). 
 
        2. This act shall take effect immediately but section 
       1 shall remain inoperative until the 180th day following 
       enactment. 
 
Section 30:4-15.1 was enacted in January of 1998 and 
went into effect in July of that year. Between August and 
December of 1998 ten lawsuits asserting, inter alia, the 
invalidity of S 30:4-15.1 were filed in the District Court 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. S 1983. The plaintiffs-- one of whom 
was Mr. Myrie and another of whom was Mr. White-- in 
these several lawsuits were all persons incarcerated in state 
or county prisons in New Jersey. The defendants were state 
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officials, led by (then) Governor Whitman. The District 
Court consolidated the several lawsuits for the limited 
purpose of dealing in unified fashion with their common 
ingredient -- the constitutional claims involvingS 30:4- 
15.1. The federal constitutional claims were that the statute 
violated the double jeopardy, ex post facto, bill of attainder, 
and excessive fines clauses1, and also deprived the plaintiffs 
of due process and equal protection. The state 
constitutional claims were based on those provisions of the 
New Jersey Constitution that are counterparts of the 
federal constitutional clauses.2 On cross-motions for 
summary judgment with respect to those common 
constitutional claims, the District Court, in a thoughtful 
and comprehensive opinion, granted summary judgment in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution bars states 
from 
"pass[ing] any Bill of Attainder [or] ex post facto Law." The double 
jeopardy and excessive fines clauses are, in terms, constraints on the 
federal government ("nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb," Fifth Amendment), 
("nor excessive fines imposed," Eighth Amendment), but both constraints 
are deemed to apply to state governments as well via the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
2. Art. 4, S 7, P 3: "The Legislature shall not pass any bill of 
attainder, ex 
post facto law . . ." Art. I, S 12:". . . [E]xcessive fines shall not be 
imposed . . ." Art. I, S 11: "No person shall, after acquittal, be tried 
for 
the same offense." 
 
The foregoing state constitutional provisions appear to cover the same 
ground as the corresponding federal constitutional provisions. See, e.g., 
Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 68-69, 662 A.2d 367, 388 (1995) (bill of 
attainder and ex post facto); New Jersey v. Williams, 669 A.2d 867, 873- 
74 (N.J. Super. 1995) (excessive fines). The wording of Article I, S 11 of 
the New Jersey Constitution, which in terms is confined to prior 
acquittals, is narrower than the wording of the Fifth Amendment's 
double jeopardy clause but has the same coverage. New Jersey v. 
Widmaier, 157 N.J. 475, 490, 492-94, 499-500 (1999). 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and equal 
protection are equatable with, respectively, Article I, S 1 and Article I, 
S 5 
of the New Jersey Constitution. The New Jersey constitutional provisions 
do not track the Fourteenth Amendment's language but they appear to 
have the same content. See Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Board of Review, 
1 N.J. 545, 553, 64 A.2d 443, 446 (1949); Auto-Rite Supply Co. v. Mayor 
and Township Committeemen, 142 A.2d 612, 616-17 (N.J. Super. 1956). 
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favor of the defendants. Thereafter, because (unlike some of 
the other lawsuits) the lawsuits brought by Mr. Myrie and 
Mr. White advanced no other claims, final judgment was 
entered against Mr. Myrie and Mr. White. They have both 
appealed. 
 
I. Double Jeopardy, Ex Post Facto, and Bill of Attainder 
 
The double jeopardy, ex post facto, and bill of attainder 
provisions are discrete constitutional protections addressed 
to distinct types of impermissibly oppressive governmental 
constraints. But they have a common thread: they only 
apply to those situations in which the injury complained of 
constitutes an imposition or exaction of a "criminal" rather 
than a "civil" nature. See Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 
350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956). 
 
In Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), a case in 
which the Supreme Court rejected a contention that 
criminal prosecutions undertaken following the imposition 
of sanctions imposed by a civil regulatory agency 
constituted double jeopardy, the Court (speaking through 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and building upon its earlier 
decision in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 
(1963)), formulated the pertinent analytic scheme in the 
following terms: 
 
       Whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, 
       at least initially, a matter of statutory construction. 
       Helvering [v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391], 399[(1938)]. A 
       court must first ask whether the legislature, "in 
       establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either 
       expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the 
       other." [United States v.] Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 
       [(1980)]. Even in those cases where the legislature "has 
       indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we 
       have inquired further whether the statutory scheme 
       was so punitive either in purpose or effect," id., at 248- 
       249, as to "transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a 
       civil remedy into a criminal penalty," Rex Trailer Co. v. 
       United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956). 
 
        In making this latter determination the factors listed 
       in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168- 
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       169 (1963), provide useful guideposts, including: (1) 
       "[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative 
       disability or restraint"; (2) "whether it has historically 
       been regarded as a punishment"; (3) "whether it comes 
       into play only on a finding of scienter"; (4)"whether its 
       operation will promote the traditional aims of 
       punishment-retribution and deterrence"; (5) "whether 
       the behavior to which it applies is already a crime"; (6) 
       "whether an alternative purpose to which it may 
       rationally be connected is assignable for it"; and (7) 
       "whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
       alternative purpose assigned." It is important to note, 
       however, that "these factors must be considered in 
       relation to the statute on its face," id., at 169, and 
       "only the clearest proof " will suffice to override 
       legislative intent and transform what has been 
       denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. 
       Ward, supra at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
522 U.S. at 99-100. 
 
In the cases under review the District Court examined 
the double jeopardy, ex post facto, and bill of attainder 
challenges to S 30:4-15.1 through the prism of the Court's 
opinions in Hudson and Mendoza-Martinez . On appeal the 
parties agree that Hudson/Mendoza-Martinez is the 
appropriate constitutional template, but appellants (Junior 
Myrie and Norwood White) argue that the District Court 
misapplied it, while appellees (the State officials) argue that 
the District Court got it right. 
 
We concur in the parties' acknowledgment that 
Hudson/Mendoza-Martinez is the proper rubric. We turn 
now to the application of its principles to appellants' 
claims. 
 
A. Did the New Jersey Legislature intendS 30:4-15.1 to 
       be a "civil" imposition or a "criminal" one? 
 
As the Chief Justice explained in Hudson,"[w]hether a 
particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least 
initially, a matter of statutory construction . . . . A court 
must first ask whether the legislature, `in establishing the 
penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or 
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impliedly a preference for one label or the other.' " 522 U.S. 
at 99. F 
 
In Auge v. New Jersey Dep't of Corrections, 743 A.2d 315 
(N.J. Super. 2000), a case decided shortly after the District 
Court's dismissal of appellants' claims, the Appellate 
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court rejected a New 
Jersey prison inmate's contention that Chapter 396 of the 
Laws of 1997 -- codified as S 30:4-15.1-- contravened his 
double jeopardy, ex post facto, and due process rights. The 
Auge court's opinion provides an instructive summary of 
the events -- going back to 1971 -- that led to the 
enactment of S 30:4-15.1: 
 
       In 1971, the Legislature enacted the Criminal Injuries 
       Compensation Act (the Act). L. 1971, c. 317, N.J.S.A. 
       52:4B-1 to 21. "The primary purpose of the Act is to 
       provide compensation to persons who have suffered 
       bodily injury from the commission of a serious crime." 
       White v. Violent Crimes Compensation Bd., 76 N.J. 368, 
       386, 388 A.2d 206 (1978). However, the Legislature 
       failed during the 1970s to appropriate sufficient funds 
       to provide adequate and timely compensation to violent 
       crimes victims in accordance with the Act. See 
       Assembly Judiciary Law, Public Safety & Defense 
       Committee, Statement to Assembly Bill No. 3648 (194 
       N.J. Leg., 2d Sess. 1979) (noting that as of 1977"the 
       number of claims as well as insufficient funding[had] 
       created a situation where a claimant [had] to wait up 
       to 3 years before receiving relief "). To establish an 
       additional source of funding, the Legislature enacted 
       Chapter 396 of the Laws of 1979 (N.J.S.A. 2C:43-3.1), 
       which required any person convicted of any crime or 
       other enumerated offense to be assessed a penalty 
       ranging from $25 [FN1] to $10,000 and directed that 
       the money collected from the penalty be deposited in a 
       separate account for the compensation of victims of 
       violent crimes. However, the penalties imposed under 
       this legislation still failed to generate sufficient revenue 
       to fully fund the program because they often could not 
       be collected. Sponsor's Statement to S.2082 (207th 
       N.J. Leg., 2d Sess. 1997). 
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       FN1. The minimum amount of the penalty has since 
       been increased to $50. L. 1991, c. 329, S 3. 
 
       In an effort to make up for this continuing shortfall in 
       the funding required to compensate the victims of 
       violent crimes, the Legislature enacted Chapter 396 of 
       the Laws of 1997 [S 30:4-15.1] which imposes a 10% 
       surcharge upon the price of all commodities purchased 
       in prison commissaries and directs that money 
       collected from this surcharge be deposited in the 
       Victims of Crime Compensation Board Account. The 
       Assembly Appropriation Committee's statement 
       concerning the bill notes that: 
 
       The VCCB [Violent Crimes Compensation Board] 
       surcharge authorized under this bill is expected to 
       generate between $1.2 and $1.5 million annually for 
       the VCCB. When coupled with federal matching 
       funds, the VCCB should have approximately $2 
       million in new moneys available to compensate crime 
       victims [Assembly Appropriations Committee, 
       Statement to Senate Committee Substitute for 
       S.2082 (207th N.J. Leg., 2d Sess. 1977).] 
 
743 A.2d at 317. 
 
The statement of the Assembly Appropriations Committee 
quoted in Auge was dated December 11, 1997. On 
December 16, a "fiscal note" on the pending bill enlarged on 
the statement of the Assembly Appropriations Committee. 
The fiscal note explained why the statutory surcharge was 
to be imposed on all inmate purchases, not just on 
purchases by inmates who still owed money to the Victims 
of Crime Compensation Board (VCCB): according to the 
fiscal note, developing a computer system capable of 
identifying the inmates owing money to the VCCB would 
have been prohibitively expensive. The fiscal note also 
pointed out that exempting correctional facility commissary 
sales from New Jersey's sales tax -- then, as now, 6% -- 
would reduce the aggregate anticipated annual surcharge 
revenue of $1,000,000 by "up to" $600,000. 3 
 
(Text continued on page 10) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The full text of the fiscal note is as follows: 
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       Fiscal Note to Senate Committee Substitute for Senate No. 2082 
       State of New Jersey - Dated: December 17, 1997 
 
       Senate Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 2082 of 1997 
       imposes a 10 percent surcharge on all commissary sales in State 
       and county correctional facilities in order to generate additional 
       revenues to compensate crime victims pursuant to the"Criminal 
       Injuries Compensation Act of 1971," P.L. 1971, c.317 (C52:4B-1 et 
       seq.) or any other law. The bill also provides that any sales 
subject 
       to the surcharge would not be subject to sales tax. 
 
        Every defendant found guilty of a criminal offense is required by 
       law to pay an assessment to the Victims of Crime Compensation 
       Board (VCCB). The moneys paid into the VCCB's account are used 
       to provide compensation to the victims of crime. However, although 
       every defendant is assessed a penalty payable to the VCCB, not all 
       of those assessments are paid. 
 
        The Department of Corrections states that about $10 million is 
       spent by State prisoners on commissary purchases each year. The 
       department notes that it is not clear whether the 10 percent 
       surcharge would be added to every commissary purchase regardless 
       of whether an inmate owes VCCB assessment or not. Although the 
       department is unable to estimate the cost of implementing this 
       program, it states that if only inmates who owe VCCB assessments 
       are subject to the surcharge, it would be required to identify the 
       specific inmates and the amount of unpaid assessment for both 
       current and prior convictions. Current computer systems lack the 
       ability to identify and track VCCB assessment or any other revenue 
       categories. Modification of software would be extremely costly, and 
       even with the modifications, insufficient capacity for data storage 
       would prohibit the ability to operate such a system. A manual 
       system for researching and tracking assessments and payments 
       would not be feasible. 
 
        The Office of Legislative Services (OLS) notes that if the 
       assessment is placed on all inmate commissary purchases 
       regardless of the amount owed per inmate, the department would 
       simply be required to increase the product prices by 10 percent, 
for 
       total annual collections of about $1 million, to be transferred to 
the 
       VCCB for the payment of claims. The OLS also notes that the 
       elimination of the requirement to pay sales tax on certain items 
       would reduce State revenue by up to $600,000 per year. The cost of 
       implementing such a program should be minimal. 
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We think that the history of S 30:4-15.1 (the Auge court's 
description of its provenance, together with the recital of 
the Assembly Appropriations Committee and the 
supplementary fiscal note) convincingly demonstrates that 
the intent of the Legislature was to put in place a civil 
remedial program: a program designed to generate funds 
that would help New Jersey fulfill its long-standing but only 
partially realized commitment to compensate crime victims, 
not a program designed to add further punishment to those 
incarcerated. 
 
To be sure, this history does not specify why the 
Legislature looked to prison inmates as the source of the 
needed revenues. It would seem, however, not unreasonable 
to infer that the Legislature regarded the inmate population 
as a cohort whose members were in large measure 
accountable for the victim harms for which adequate 
compensation had not been achieved. 
 
Such a legislative attribution of accountability-- 
assuming it was, in fact, made -- would not, of course, be 
flawless. As pointed out by the fiscal note, the program 
adopted by the Legislature contemplated that the surcharge 
would be added to the price of all inmate purchases, 
including purchases by inmates who had already completed 
payment of sums owing to the VCCB. Also, the New Jersey 
inmate population presumably included -- and continues 
to include -- persons held in pre-trial custody, not 
convicted of any crimes. But this lack of one-to-one 
correspondence between a particular inmate's purchase 
and an identifiable and precisely quantifiable dollar 
obligation to a victim does not undercut the general 
rationality of the attribution of accountability which, we 
assume, animated the Legislature. More to the point, it 
does not undercut the conclusion that the surcharge 
regime was intended by the Legislature to be civil and 
remedial. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 This fiscal note has been prepared pursuant to P.L. 1980, c.67. 
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B. Does application of the seven Mendoza-Martinez 
       factors mark S 30.4-15.1 as so punitive in effect as to 
       transform the statutory surcharge it authorizes into a 
       criminal punishment? 
 
In Section I (A) of this opinion we concluded that the text 
and history of S 30:4-15.1 show it to have been intended by 
the New Jersey Legislature to be a civil remedial program, 
not a program intended to enhance the punishment of 
persons incarcerated in New Jersey's state and county 
prisons. 
 
We now address the second question posed by the 
Hudson Court. That second question is whether, 
notwithstanding that "the legislature `has indicated an 
intention to establish a civil penalty . . . the statutory 
scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect' . . . as 
to `transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy 
into a criminal penalty.' " 522 U.S. at 99. In aid of that 
inquiry, the Supreme Court pointed lower courts to seven 
criteria identified in Mendoza-Martinez. 
 
As previously noted, the seven Mendoza-Martinez  criteria 
are as follows: 
 
       Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability 
       or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded 
       as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a 
       finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote 
       the traditional aims of punishmen-retribution and 
       deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is 
       already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to 
       which it may rationally be connected is assignable for 
       it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
       alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the 
       inquiry, and may often point in differing directions. 
 
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69. 
 
The "sanction" challenged in our case is a 10% surcharge 
added by state law to the price of retail purchases at New 
Jersey state and county prison commissaries. It has all the 
earmarks of a sales tax. Indeed, it replaces the sales tax 
that New Jersey imposes on purchases made in ordinary 
retail stores throughout the state. As of the time period 
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covered by this litigation, the New Jersey sales tax has been 
6% -- except for those categories of retail items, primarily 
food, clothes and prescription drugs, that New Jersey law 
exempts from sales tax. Thus the effective "sanction" is a 
commissary price increment of 10% for items that would be 
exempt from sales tax at a retail store, while for other items 
the commissary price increment is 4% (i.e., 10% - 6%).4 
 
The first Mendoza-Martinez inquiry is whether the 
asserted sanction is an "affirmative disability or restraint." 
The phrase apparently derives from the Court's opinion in 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). In that case the 
Court upheld, against constitutional challenge, the 
termination, pursuant to S 202(n) of the Social Security Act, 
of old-age benefits of an alien deported for past Communist 
Party membership. Among the grounds for constitutional 
challenge were contentions "that the termination of 
appellee's benefits amounts to punishing him without a 
judicial trial, see Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228; 
that the termination of benefits constitutes the imposition 
of punishment by legislative act, rendering S 202(n) a bill of 
attainder, see United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303; 
Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277; and that the 
punishment exacted is imposed for past conduct not 
unlawful when engaged in, thereby violating the 
constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws, see Ex 
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333." 363 U.S. at 613. The Flemming 
v. Nestor Court went on to observe that "[e]ssential to the 
success of each of these contentions is the validity of 
characterizing as `punishment' in the constitutional sense 
the termination of benefits under 202(n)." Id. In the course 
of its extended discussion of whether the challenged 
sanction was a " `punishment' in the constitutional sense," 
the Court observed that "[h]ere the sanction is the mere 
denial of a noncontractual governmental benefit. No 
affirmative disability or restraint is imposed, and certainly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The fact that exempting commissary sales from sales tax was expected 
by the authors of the "fiscal note", see supra, note 3, to result in an 
effective reduction of "up to" $600,000 of the anticipated aggregate 
annual surcharge revenue of $1,000,000, suggests that somewhat over 
50% of commissary purchases are of items which, at ordinary retail 
stores, would be subject to sales tax. 
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nothing approaching the `infamous punishment' of 
imprisonment, as in Wong Wing, on which great reliance is 
mistakenly placed." Id. at 617.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Court in Flemming v. Nestor was unable to equate the termination 
of old-age benefits with the " `punishment' in the constitutional sense" 
found by the Court in (1) Wong Wing (invalidating federal statute 
providing for up to a year's imprisonment at hard labor for Chinese 
aliens found, at trial without a jury, to be unlawfully in the United 
States), (2) Lovett (invalidating federal statute terminating the 
compensation, and hence the further employment, of three named 
federal employees found by the House Appropriations Committee to be 
"subversive"), (3) Cummings (invalidating post-Civil War state 
constitutional provision prohibiting, inter alia, clergymen from pursuing 
their ministry unless they took an oath that they had never been disloyal 
to the government of the United States), and (4) Garland (invalidating 
similar post-Civil War federal statute directed at lawyers). 
 
In Lovett, the Court, speaking through Justice Black, found Cummings 
and Garland to be controlling authority. Justice Black's characterization 
of Cummings and Garland is instructive: 
 
       In Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323, this Court said, "A bill 
       of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without 
a 
       judicial trial. If the punishment be less than death, the act is 
termed 
       a bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaning of the 
       Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and 
penalties." 
       The Cummings decision involved a provision of the Missouri 
       Reconstruction Constitution which required persons to take an Oath 
       of Loyalty as a prerequisite to practicing a profession. Cummings, 
a 
       Catholic Priest, was convicted for teaching and preaching as a 
       minister without taking the oath. The oath required an applicant to 
       affirm that he had never given aid or comfort to persons engaged in 
       hostility to the United States and had never "been a member of, or 
       connected with, any order, society, or organization, inimical to 
the 
       government of the United States . . ." In an illuminating opinion 
       which gave the historical background of the constitutional 
       prohibition against bills of attainder, this Court invalidated the 
       Missouri constitutional provision both because it constituted a 
bill 
       of attainder and because it had an ex post facto  operation. On the 
       same day the Cummings case was decided, the Court in Ex parte 
       Garland, 4 Wall. 333, also held invalid on the same grounds an Act 
       of Congress which required attorneys practicing before this Court 
to 
       take a similar oath. Neither of these cases has ever been 
overruled. 
       They stand for the proposition that legislative acts, no matter 
what 
       their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily 
       ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict 
       punishment on them without a judicial trial are bills of attainder 
       prohibited by the Constitution. 
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Since the withdrawal of old-age benefits challenged in 
Flemming v. Nestor was found not to constitute an 
"affirmative disability or restraint," it is plain that the 
comparatively minor imposition complained of on this 
appeal cannot be so characterized. 
 
Having determined that the statutory 10% surcharge on 
prison commissary sales is not "an affirmative disability or 
restraint," we find it possible to address with greater 
expedition the balance of the Mendoza-Martinez criteria. 
Thus, to state the question "whether [such a surcharge] has 
historically been regarded as a punishment", 372 U.S. at 
168, is, manifestly, to answer that question in the negative. 
Similarly, it is plain that the addition of a surcharge to the 
price of a retail purchase is not an event that"comes into 
play only on a finding of scienter." Id. Nor is there ground 
for supposing that the imposition of a 10% surcharge on 
commissary purchases "will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment -- retribution and deterrence." Id. Further, it is 
not the case that "the behavior to which it [the surcharge] 
applies" -- namely, purchasing items at a commissary -- 
"is already a crime." Id. 
 
The sixth Mendoza-Martinez criterion is"whether an 
alternative purpose to which [the asserted "sanction"] may 
rationally be connected is assignable for it." Id. at 168-69. 
We understand this criterion to inquire whether an 
asserted "sanction" may be reasonably regarded as having 
a purpose other than punishment. The answer is that, as 
explained in the discussion of the history of S 30:4-15-1 in 
section I (A) of this opinion, the stated legislative intention 
in providing for the surcharge was to generate additional 
funds for disbursement by the underfunded VCCB. 
 
Finally, Mendoza-Martinez inquires "whether [the asserted 
sanction] appears excessive in relation to the alternative 
purpose assigned." 372 U.S. at 169. Given that"the 
alternative purpose assigned" by the Legislature was to 
rescue the underfunded VCCB, the anticipated annual 
revenue from the 10% surcharge of between $1,200,000 
and $1,500,000 (potentially augmented by matching federal 
funds) has not been shown to be excessive. Nor is there any 
persuasive showing that the 10% surcharge is excessive 
when considered from the perspective of the inmate- 
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purchasers: an addition of up to 10% to the price of a retail 
item may certainly be obnoxious (and, indeed, might well 
serve as a substantial disincentive to purchase expensive 
items -- e.g., electronic equipment, automobiles, household 
appliances, works of art -- of a sort not likely to be sold at 
a prison commissary), but such an increment cannot be 
perceived as skewing the commissary price structure in 
radical fashion; moreover, as noted above, the effective 
price increase for many commissary items is in fact not 
10%, but 4%, since the 6% sales tax that would attach to 
numerous items in non-prison retail stores is not applicable 
to prison commissary sales.6 
 
Thus, we distill out of the seven Mendoza-Martinez 
criteria no support for the proposition that the surcharge is 
" `so punitive either in purpose or effect'. . . as to 
`transfor[m] what was clearly intended as a civil remedy 
into a criminal penalty.' " Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99. And, in 
light of the Court's instruction that the Mendoza-Martinez 
" `factors must be considered in relation to the statute on 
its face' and `only the clearest proof ' will suffice to override 
legislative intent and transform what has been 
denominated a civil penalty into a criminal penalty," 
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 100, we conclude that the surcharge 
authorized by S 30:4-15.1 does not constitute 
" `punishment' in the constitutional sense" and hence its 
imposition on purchases made by appellants at prison 
commissaries does not offend the double jeopardy, bill of 
attainder, or ex post facto clauses of the federal 
Constitution. Given that the cognate provisions of the New 
Jersey Constitution have essentially the same meaning as 
their federal counterparts, supra notes 1 and 2, appellants' 
claims pursuant to the New Jersey provisions are also 
unavailing. 
 
II. Excessive Fines 
 
As noted earlier in this opinion, both the Eighth 
Amendment of the federal Constitution and Article I,S 12 of 
the New Jersey Constitution bar the imposition of 
"excessive fines," and these identical phrases have been 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See text at note 4, supra. 
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construed to have the same content. Supra notes 1 and 2. 
Although, as a general matter, the prohibition on"excessive 
fines" is a limitation on "the government's power to extract 
payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for 
some offense," Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 601, 609- 
10 (1993), the prohibition is not confined to exactions 
imposed as an aspect of the criminal law enforcement 
process. See id. at 607-08. A civil imposition, such as a 
civil forfeiture, which is adjudged "excessive," would fall 
within the purview of the constitutional bar. But, as we 
have noted in our discussion of the Martinez-Mendoza 
criteria, the 10% surcharge challenged by appellants is not 
"excessive" when viewed in the context of the reasons for its 
enactment. Accordingly, we conclude that appellants' claim 
that the surcharge constitutes an "excessive fine" is without 
merit. 
 
III. Due Process and Equal Protection 
 
We turn, finally, to appellants' contentions that the 
surcharge offends the federal due process and equal 
protection guarantees as well as their New Jersey 
constitutional counterparts. Appellants' due process 
argument proceeds along two alternative lines: 
 
First, appellants "submit that . . . the statutory surcharge 
is not rationally related to the purportedly legitimate 
governmental interest of bridging the funding gap for the 
Victims of Crime Compensation Board . . . Assuming this to 
be a `legitimate' governmental purpose, [appellants] contend 
that the rational `means' to achieve that purpose would be 
to establish a more effective collection mechanism, to 
secure payments from those defendants obliged under 
court orders to pay same, rather than to allocate 
responsibility for `filling the funding gap' to a class of 
individuals defined only by their status as inmates and not 
by any claimed status as VCCB `obligors.' " 
 
It cannot be doubted that "establish[ing] a more effective 
collection mechanism" for the sums owed by "VCCB 
`obligors' " would be a "rational `means' " to augment VCCB 
revenues. Conceivably, indeed, such a "more effective 
collection mechanism" would harvest revenue more quickly 
 
                                16 
 
 
than the challenged surcharge. But the due process clause 
does not authorize courts to exercise oversight with respect 
to the comparative efficiency, and/or relative wisdom, of the 
particular measure or measures that a legislature selects 
from a menu of possible measures reasonably calculated to 
achieve a permissible legislative objective. Provided that the 
measure selected by the legislature is reasonably calculated 
to bring about in some significant degree the achievement 
of an appropriate legislative goal, the legislature's choice of 
measures is not open to judicial second-guessing. 
 
Second, arguing in the alternative, appellants submit that 
"[w]hile the statute may have a purported`permissible 
legislative purpose,' nonetheless, the arbitrary and 
capricious classification of inmates as the only group 
responsible for serving that purpose, vitiates any possibility 
of finding `a real and substantial relationship' between the 
`means' selected by the statute and its proffered`legislative 
purpose'." 
 
The flaw in this prong of appellants' due process 
argument inheres in appellants' characterization of the 
"classification of inmates as the only group responsible for 
serving that [legislative] purpose" as"arbitrary and 
capricious." We have pointed out, in Section I (A) of this 
opinion, that "[i]t would seem . . . not unreasonable to infer 
that the Legislature regarded the inmate population as a 
cohort whose members were in large measure accountable 
for the victim harms for which adequate compensation had 
not been achieved." And, after noting the likelihood that 
some fraction of the inmate population would not, in fact, 
owe anything to the VCCB, we stated that "this lack of one- 
to-one correspondence between a particular inmate's 
purchase and an identifiable and precisely quantifiable 
dollar obligation to a victim does not undercut the general 
rationality of the attribution of accountability which, we 
assume, animated the Legislature." 
 
Appellants' equal protection claim is, in essence, an 
extension and refinement of the due process claim, just 
addressed, that the Legislature's selection of prison inmates 
to bear the entire burden of the surcharge was "arbitrary 
and capricious." According to appellants, "[n]ot only is the 
nexus between the statutory means and the proffered 
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government interest irrational . . . the statutory 
classification of affected individuals is likewise irrational 
and arbitrary, thereby constituting a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. A law such as N.J. Stat. Ann. 30:4-15.1, 
that creates a `wholly arbitrary' classification cannot 
withstand judicial scrutiny when it manifests prejudice 
against `discrete and insular minorities' (such as prisoners), 
according to Justice Stone's famous footnote in United 
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 151 n.4 (1938)." 
 
Appellants' argument reaches too far. Prisoners, taken in 
the large, are not a "discrete and insular minorit[y]." They 
are not a "suspect classification." Hundreds of statutes and 
administrative regulations, both state and federal, deal 
comprehensively and in detail with persons who are 
incarcerated, and, in the main, they are deemed to be as 
presumptively constitutional as other legislative and 
administrative directives. 
 
On the other hand, we appreciate that there could be 
circumstances in which a statute or regulation that has 
valid application to an aggregate prison population the 
generality of whom are, like appellants, convicted felons, 
might nevertheless be open to challenge as applied to 
particular inmate sub-groups who do not share the 
characteristics that justify the constraints imposed by the 
challenged statute or regulation on the general prison 
population. But appellants, in challenging S 30:4-15.1, do 
not present themselves -- and, indeed, would lack standing 
to present themselves -- as champions of a hypothetical 
inmate sub-group. They challenge the statute 




For the foregoing reasons -- reasons which in substantial 
measure track the careful opinion of the District Court -- 
the judgments of the District Court granting summary 
judgment dismissing appellants' claims are affirmed. 
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